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MORE STORIES OF JURISDICTIONSTRIPPING AND
EXECUTIVE POWER: INTERPRETING THE PRISON
LITIGATION REFORM ACT (PLRA)
Giovanna Shay* and Johanna Kalb**

INTRODUCTION
In the last several years, the Supreme Court has decided a number
of important challenges to the government’s conduct of its “War on
Terror.” Brought on behalf of persons alleged to be “enemy
combatants,” many of whom were detained at Guantánamo Bay, these
suits challenged the prisoners’ indefinite detention,1 asserted their right
to access federal courts,2 and questioned the legality of the tribunals
created to adjudicate the charges against them.3 The debate about the
detainees’ access to federal courts has continued in Congress, with the
passage of the Military Commissions Act (MCA),4 and in the lower
courts, with challenges to the MCA.5 At the time this article goes to
press, the Guantánamo litigation has returned once again to the U.S.
* Assistant Professor at Western New England College School of Law. This article was
written with the support of the Robert M. Cover Clinical Teaching Fellowship at Yale Law
School. Ms. Shay was counsel for amicus curiae Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of
the Yale Law School (LSO) in both Woodford v. Ngo and Jones v. Bock. She also was a member
of the legal team representing amicus curiae the Public Defender Service for the District of
Columbia (PDS) in Rumsfeld v. Padilla. Ms. Shay is a member of the Stop Abuse and Violence
Everywhere (SAVE) coalition, a group of scholars and advocates dedicated to reforming the
PLRA. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone. The authors thank readers John
Boston, Lynn S. Branham, Dan Kahan, Christopher Lasch, Kermit Roosevelt, Stephen Wizner,
and the members of the Yale Law School Fellows’ WorksinProgress Workshop for their
insightful comments, and Rosalind C. Kalb for her editorial assistance.
* * Yale Law School, J.D. 2006.
1 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that a “citizendetainee seeking to
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker”).
2 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (concluding that federal habeas jurisdiction under then
extant version of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 extended to Guantánamo detainees).
3 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (holding that military commissions then in
effect were not authorized by Congress and did not comply with the Uniform Code of Military
Justice or the Geneva Conventions).
4 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109366, 120 Stat. 2600.
5 See Boumediene et al. v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464
F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006).
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Supreme Court with challenges to the MCA.6
Although the
Guantánamo litigation directly concerns a limited number of people
(about 357 detainees remained at Guantánamo Bay as of July 3, 2007),7
it presents crucial issues regarding the scope of executive authority,
separation of powers, and the role of the judiciary. Because of their
broad implications, these cases have captured attention in the academy,8
legal community,9 and press.10
During the same time period as the Guantánamo litigation, the
Supreme Court has considered another set of cases regarding the rights
6 On June 29, 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06
1195, and Al Odah v. U.S., No. 061196, scheduling oral argument for October 2007. Also this
year, Senators Spector and Leahy introduced to the newly Democratcontrolled Congress the
Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of 2006, which would eliminate the provisions of the Military
Commissions Act that bar any alien detained as an enemy combatant from filing a writ of habeas
corpus and bar habeas review of any military commission proceeding. Habeas Corpus
Restoration Act of 2006, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/s4081.html.
7 Thom Shanker & David Johnston, Legislation Could Be Path to Closing Guantánamo,
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2007, at A10.
8 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to
Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65 (2006) [hereinafter Katyal, The Legal Academy Goes to
Practice]; see also Janet Cooper Alexander, JurisdictionStripping in the War on Terrorism, 2
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 259 (2006) (exploring the constitutionality of the Detainee Treatment Act);
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan
Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006) (describing
the development of the “National Surveillance State”); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The
Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to
Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007) (making formalist arguments for the proposition
that the Constitution forbids Congress from divesting the Supreme Court of jurisdiction); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and the War on Terrorism, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2006) (critiquing the Bush Administration’s attempts to expand Executive
power); Neil K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantánamo Cases, 2004
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 49 (2004) (explaining the Court’s rejection of Executive power in Rasul v.
Bush and AlOdah v. United States); Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in
Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145 (2006) (discussing the national and international legal regimes
preventing the Executive from authorizing the use of torture); John T. Parry, Terrorism and the
New Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765 (2007) (arguing that the war on terror
has contributed to the development of a “new criminal process” in which war and law
enforcement converge); Joseph T. Thai, The Law Clerk Who Wrote Rasul v. Bush: John Paul
Stevens’s Influence From World War II to the War on Terror, 92 VA. L. REV. 501 (2006)
(discussing Justice Stevens’s opinion in Rasul, holding that federal courts could exercise
jurisdiction over detainees held at Guantánamo Bay).
9 See Katyal, The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, supra note 8, at 74. Ultimately thirty
nine amicus briefs were filed on behalf of Mr. Hamdan. Professor Katyal writes: “There were
over 150 proposed briefs, and I spent hundreds of hours convincing groups not to submit them.”
Id. at 118.
10 See Linda Greenhouse, The Ruling on Tribunals: The Overview; Justices, 53, Broadly
Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at A1; Charles Lane, High Court
Rejects Detainee Tribunals; 5 to 3 Ruling Curbs President’s Claim of Wartime Power, WASH.
POST, June 30, 2006, at A1; Warren Richey, Supreme Court Rejects Military Tribunals, The High
Court’s 5to3 Ruling Thursday Scuttled US Plans for Guantánamo Detainees, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, June 30, 2006, at 1; David G. Savage, The Guantánamo Decision: High
Court Rejects Bush’s Claim That He Alone Sets Detainee Rules, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at
A1.
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of other incarcerated persons—not enemy combatants, but prisoners and
detainees in the civilian criminal justice system. These cases concern
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the barriers it erects to
court access for domestic prisoners. They also involve the limits of
executive power, access to courts, and jurisdictionstripping.11 Unlike
the Guantánamo cases, however, the PLRA cases have received
virtually no press coverage12 and little scholarly attention.13
The watershed decision among the PLRA cases is Woodford v.
Ngo, in which the Supreme Court decided that the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement incorporates a procedural default rule.14 While a simple
exhaustion provision would require that a prisoner present his complaint
to prison officials before filing suit, the extra gloss of procedural default
means that, if the prison rejects a grievance on procedural grounds—
because it is untimely or otherwise fails to comply with institutional
grievance rules—a court may never be able to consider the claim. For
example, the plaintiff in Woodford, an inmate in the California state
prison system, was barred from litigating his claims in federal court
because he missed a fifteenday deadline in the prison grievance
procedure.15
While ostensibly relying on statutory interpretation, Woodford
borrowed from habeas and administrative law to create its procedural
default rule. The Woodford rule allows a prisoner’s mistakes in the
prison grievance system to scuttle potential federal constitutional
claims. Even more troubling, the decision effectively leaves the ability
to define the hurdles a prisoner must clear (in the form of prison
grievance procedures) in the hands of prison officials, making them

11 At least one court observer has drawn a connection between the “War on Terror” cases and
domestic jurisdictionstripping. See Emily Bazelon, Block That Branch, Why Can Congress Take
Cases Away From the Courts?, SLATE, December 16, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2155515/
(drawing connection between the jurisdictionstripping of the Military Commissions Act decision
in Hamdan and the recent Supreme Court AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) decision in Carey v. Musladin) (last visited February 10, 2007).
12 A Westlaw search of the New York Times archives performed on February 10, 2007 found
43 articles discussing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and no articles discussing Woodford v. Ngo.
13 A few law review articles noted the emerging circuit splits. The most comprehensive
scholarly treatment of these issues was Professor Kermit Roosevelt’s article Exhaustion Under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771,
1806 (2003); see also Adam Slutsky, Note, Totally Exhausted: Why a Strict Interpretation of 42
U.S.C. §1997e(a) Unduly Burdens Courts and Prisoners, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289 (2005);
Jamie Ayers, Comment., To Plead or Not to Plead: Does the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s
Exhaustion Requirement Establish a Pleading Requirement or an Affirmative Defense?, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 247 (2005); Kristen S. Coy, Note, Exhaustion Under the PLRA: Reinforcing the
Rehabilitative Function of American Prisons, 14 WIDENER L.J. 989 (2005); Andrea Jacobs,
Comment, Prison Power Corrupts Absolutely: Exploring the Phenomenon of Prison Guard
Brutality and the Need to Develop a System of Accountability, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 277 (2004).
14 Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006).
15 Id. at 2384.
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gatekeepers to both federal and, in some jurisdictions, state courts.16
Thus, Woodford enhances the already significant jurisdictionstripping
effects of the PLRA, which include limitations on the prospective relief
that federal courts can order.17
The consolidated cases of Williams v. Overton and Jones v. Bock,18
decided in January 2007, presented three more procedural issues
relating to the exhaustion requirement. The plaintiffs in these cases
challenged a series of judiciallycreated rules imposed by the Sixth
Circuit, whose combined effect had resulted in the dismissal of a
significant number of prisoner cases in that circuit.19 The Jones court
rejected the Sixth Circuit’s rules. It concluded that exhaustion is an
affirmative defense that can be raised by the defendants rather than a
requirement that the prisoner must plead; that the statute does not
require prisoners to name defendants in their initial grievances in order
to sue them later in court; and that a failure to exhaust a single claim
does not mandate dismissal of other, exhausted claims in the lawsuit.20
The decision in Jones suggests that there is a limit to the
procedural requirements that courts can impose under the ostensible
rubric of the PLRA—that if the requirement has no basis in the statute
and deviates from “the usual procedural practice” it goes too far.21 The
Jones court reaffirmed that, “[o]ur legal system . . . remains committed
to guaranteeing that prisoner claims of illegal conduct by their
custodians are fairly handled according to law.”22
16 See, e.g., Richardson v. Comm. of Correction, 863 A.2d 754, 756 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005)
(assuming that the PLRA exhaustion requirement applies to federal constitutional claims in state
court); Cole v. Isherwood, 716 N.W.2d 36, 4243 (Neb. 2006) (same); Baker v. Rolnick, 110 P.3d
1284, 128788 (Ariz. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that § 1997e applies to § 1983 prisoner lawsuits in
both state and federal court); Bloom v. Muckenthaler, 117 P.3d 151 at *3 (Kan. App. Ct. 2005)
(unpublished) (same).
17 See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (concluding that provision of the PLRA that
permits automatic stay of injunction upon filing of motion alleging that it does not comply with
PLRA requirements for entry of prospective relief did not violate separation of powers); see also
Lynn S. Branham, Keeping The “Wolf Out of the Fold”: Separation of Powers and
Congressional Termination of Equitable Relief, 26 J. LEGIS. 185 (2000).
18 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007).
19 The vast majority of prisoner screening orders reported on Westlaw result in dismissal of
the prisoner’s suit. Brief for the A.C.L.U. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Jones v.
Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007) (Nos. 057058, 057142), 2006 WL 2364683, at *3536 & n.42 (“Of
the nearly 500 prisoner screening orders available on Westlaw from the Sixth Circuit since Jones
Bey was decided, only eighteen allowed the prisoner to proceed.”).
20 Id.
21 Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 920. The Court echoed this theme again later in the 2006 term in
Erickson v. Pardus, a brief per curiam opinion issued June 4, 2007 that was joined by seven
Justices. 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007). In Pardus, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated
the opinion of the Tenth Circuit, explaining that the court had improperly imposed a heightened
pleading standard on the prisoner’s pro se complaint. Id. at 2200. “Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief,’” the Court explained. Id.
22 Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 914.
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However, while Jones concluded that courts could not impose a
requirement that a prisoner must name the defendants in his grievances,
it said that courts could enforce such requirements if they were included
in the prison grievance procedures.23 The opinion thus reaffirms that,
under Woodford, courts must defer to prison regulations.
The PLRA exhaustion cases may appear at first to be arcane
procedural debates, not titanic constitutional struggles. However, for
the more than two million Americans incarcerated in 2005,24 they
present significant court access issues. The case of Minix v. Pazera,25
which was cited in the Woodford dissent,26 demonstrates the draconian
effect of a procedural default rule.27 In Minix, a teen suffered serious
abuse by other incarcerated juveniles for months, in a facility that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) later found “fails to adequately protect the
juveniles in its care from harm.”28 Despite the fact that his mother had
contacted numerous state officials to complain,29 the Minix family’s suit
was dismissed on summary judgment for failure to exhaust.30 The
procedures in place in Indiana juvenile facilities at the time required that
a child file a grievance within two business days of an incident.31 In its
findings letter, issued about two months after Minix was dismissed, the
DOJ noted that “[t]he dysfunctional grievance system at South Bend
contributes to the State’s failure to ensure a reasonably safe
environment.”32 Thus, despite the fact that an agency of the federal
government confirmed that S.Z. was incarcerated in a facility that failed
to protect juveniles’ civil rights, and that the grievance system (which at
the time imposed a twoworkingday deadline) was ineffectual, his
federal civil rights suit was dismissed for failure to file a grievance.33
Minix illustrates the harsh operation of a procedural default rule in
the PLRA exhaustion context. In the absence of procedural default, the
Id. at 92223.
PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2005, at 1 (2006).
25 Minix v. Pazera, No. 1:04 CV 447 RM, 2005 WL 1799538 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 2005).
26 Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Brief for the Jerome N.
Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (No. 05416), 2006 WL 304573, at *34.
27 See Anna Rapa, Comment, One Brick Too Many: The Prison Litigation Reform Act as a
Barrier to Legitimate Juvenile Lawsuits, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 263 (2006) (arguing for an
amendment to the PLRA exempting juveniles from its provisions).
28 Letter from Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Mitch Daniels,
now Governor of the State of Indiana 2, 3, 7 (Sept. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/findsettle.htm#FindingsLetters (click on “Investigation of the
South Bend Correctional Juvenile Facility, Indiana”) (last visited February 21, 2007).
29 Id. at *2, 4.
30 The case had been removed to federal court by the defendants. The district court dismissed
without prejudice and remanded to state court for litigation of the state law claims. Id. at *7.
31 Id. at *6.
32 Id.
33 Minix, 2005 WL 1799538, at *7.
23
24
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twoworkingday deadline would not be an insurmountable stumbling
block to the federal constitutional claims. The court could dismiss the
suit without prejudice (or stay it) to allow the prisoner to file a late
grievance, thereby giving the prison authorities the option of deciding
whether to address the claim on the merits despite its tardiness.34
Whether the prison authorities address the claim on the merits or
dismiss it for lateness, under a simple exhaustion regime the claim
would be considered “exhausted” if the prison authorities had an
opportunity to address it.35 Now that procedural default has been added
to the exhaustion requirement, however, the prison’s determination that
a claim is late generally means that it was not “properly exhausted,” and
so is defaulted, thereby barring the lawsuit.36 Ironically, if prison
authorities deny a grievance on the merits, courts can review that
decision. But if prison authorities deny it on procedural grounds, under
Woodford, courts must defer to that determination, and the claim is
procedurally barred.37
Moreover, under the Woodford rule, a
procedurallydefaulted claim is barred regardless of whether it was
frivolous or meritorious.38
Cases like Minix provide sufficient cause for concern,39 but the
significance of the PLRA decisions extends beyond their immediate
impact on prison litigation. John Boston, the foremost practitioner
expert on PLRA doctrine, has described the PLRA as “the new face of
court stripping,” because it limits review through “new standards and
34 Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 178082. Whether a stay (as opposed to dismissal without
prejudice) would be permissible under the PLRA in the absence of a procedural default
requirement is debatable. Prior to the PLRA, the exhaustion provision contemplated stays,
providing that, “the court shall, if the court believes that such requirement would be appropriate
and in the interests of justice, continue such case for a period of not to exceed 180 days in order to
require exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available.”
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994). The PLRA removed this provision. Stays are used in the habeas
corpus context to permit exhaustion of unexhausted claims. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269
(2005) (holding that district courts have discretion to stay a mixed habeas petition to permit a
petitioner to present unexhausted claims to the state court and then to return to federal court for
review).
35 Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 178082.
36 Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2382.
37 Brief for the A.C.L.U. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Woodford v. Ngo,
126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (No. 05416), 2006 WL 284226, at *2728.
38 Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2401 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
39 The abuse described in Minix is alltoocommon. In the past year, the Texas juvenile
justice system has faced widespread accusations of sexual abuse and coverup by school staff
members and their supervisors. See Ralph Blumenthal, Investigations Multiplying in Juvenile
Abuse Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at 1.24; Ralph Blumenthal, Texan Calls for Takeover
of State’s Juvenile Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2007, at A11; see also Cassi Feldman, State
Facilities’ Use of Force is Scrutinized After a Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at 1.29; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, CUSTODY AND CONTROL: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN NEW YORK’S
JUVENILE PRISONS FOR GIRLS (2006), available at hrw.org/reports/2006/us0906; STOP PRISONER
RAPE, IN THEIR OWN WORDS: RECENT EXAMPLES OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF YOUTH BEHIND BARS
(2006), available at www.spr.org/pdf/prea_update_june_06.pdf.
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. . . procedures,” rather than explicitly drawing “lines and erect[ing]
walls.”40 In so doing, the PLRA cases demonstrate yet another form of
jurisdictionstripping, contributing to the overall shift of power to the
executive that we currently see in other contexts, including in the “War
on Terror” on all its fronts.41
In this Article we seek to focus attention on some of the more
important ramifications of Woodford and Jones. We begin in Part I
with a short history of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, starting with
the context of its enactment and concluding with the PLRA exhaustion
cases of the past two terms. Next, in Part II, we explain how these
cases, and particularly the Court’s decision in Woodford, work to strip
courts of jurisdiction by adopting comitybased exhaustion rules—what
we describe as the “habeasification” of civil rights.42 In Part III, we
address why the habeas and administrative law analogies relied on by
the Court in Woodford were misplaced, given the realities of prison and
jail grievance systems. Finally, in Part IV, we attempt to explain the
dangers of consensual jurisdictionstripping, in which courts adopt rules
that voluntarily relinquish jurisdiction, often to promote caseload
management or ease of administration.
I. THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT: THE CLOSING OF THE
COURTHOUSE DOOR
The passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)—and the
current litigation about its exhaustion provision—echo recurring debates
about the proper role of the federal courts in addressing prison abuses.
40 John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 429, 42930 (2001); see also Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1555, 164950 (2003) [hereinafter Schlanger, Inmate Litigation].
41 Comments from the Yale Law School Fellows’ WorksinProgress, and in particular Asli
Bali, contributed to our thinking on this point. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No.
109366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); see also American Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Security
Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), stay granted by 467 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006)
(discussing secret Terrorist Surveillance Program). The government’s “War on Terror” rhetoric
already borrows from the PLRA context. In his testimony in support of the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005, Senator Kyl argued in favor of stripping federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over
Guantánamo detainees by citing examples of frivolous prisoner suits that had been ridiculed
nearly ten years earlier in the debates over the PLRA—including the nowinfamous case of a
prisoner suing for “chunky peanut butter.” Alexander, supra note 8 at 263 (citing 151 Cong. Rec.
S12652, S12660 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl)). Commentators also have
noted that certain kinds of abuse may be exported from the domestic prison context to the “War
on Terror.” See Jacobs, supra note 13, at 277 (noting that “two of the seven MPs charged with
the abusive acts [at Abu Ghraib] were prison guards in their civilian life”).
42 Indeed, for the reasons described supra in note 34, a procedural default rule may work
more harsh consequences in the PLRA context than in habeas, because stay provisions are
routinely used in habeas to permit exhaustion of unexhausted claims, while they have been
removed from CRIPA by the PLRA.
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Under the socalled “handsoff doctrine,” which prevailed until the
1960s, courts generally did not review claimed violations of state
prisoners’ rights.43 The ostensible rationale for the “handsoff”
approach varied, but included “the theory of separation of powers; the
lack of judicial expertise in penology; and the fear that intervention by
the courts [would] subvert prison discipline.”44
In the 1960s and 1970s, the “handsoff” doctrine eroded.45 The
Court “began to scrutinize various aspects of police and prosecutorial
conduct” in its criminal procedure cases,46 and took a more “expansive
reading of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape.”47 The Civil Rights
Act was applied to state prisoners.48 After the Attica riot in 1971,
sophisticated civil rights organizations like the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) began aggressively and systematically litigating prison
cases.49 “[F]aced with sometimes uncontested proof of brutal and
unhealthful jail and prison environments not just in isolation cells but
throughout facilities, judges began to find that such conditions also
violated the constitutional rights of inmates and to issue injunctive
orders . . . .”50
Professor Margo Schlanger has described this initial period of
prison reform litigation as “a nationwide flood of classaction
lawsuits.”51 Twentyfour percent of state prisons were under court
order by 1984.52 Predictably, such orders were often criticized as
judicial activism.53 However, even critics of federal court intervention
had to admit that prison conditions were often abysmal and in need of
43 See Margo Schlanger, The Courts, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation
as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 2000 (1999) [hereinafter Schlanger, Beyond the Hero
Judge]; Lorijean Golichowski Dei, Note, The New Standard of Review for Prisoners’ Rights: A
“Turner” For the Worse?, 33 VILL L. REV. 393, 399 (1988) (quoting Ruffin v. Commonwealth,
62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871)) (“Courts considered prisoners to be ‘slaves of the State,’
having ‘not only forfeited their liberty, but all their personal rights . . . .’”); see also Notes and
Comments, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963); Ronald L. Goldfarb & Linda R. Singer,
Redressing Prisoners’ Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175 (1970); Mark Berger,
Withdrawal of Rights and Due Deference: The New Hands Off Policy in Correctional Litigation,
47 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1 (19781979).
44 Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 43 at 181.
45 Id. at 183.
46 Id.
47 Dei, supra note 43, at 401 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 436 U.S. 167 (1961) (concluding that
illegal actions of state actors, such as illegal search and seizure, gave rise to claims under § 1983,
as well as stateauthorized constitutional violations)).
48 Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 43, at 184 (citing Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964)).
49 Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge, supra note 43, at 2017.
50 Id. at 2003.
51 Id. at 2004.
52 Id.
53 See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE
L.J. 1, 1219 (1997).
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remedy. ThenJustice Rehnquist wrote, “[t]he deplorable conditions
and Draconian restrictions of some of our Nation’s prisons are too well
known to require recounting here, and the federal courts have rightly
condemned these sordid aspects of our prison systems.”54 But the Court
continued to defer to prison officials in many other ways, including,
inter alia, in its test for determining whether a prison regulation unduly
impinged on constitutional rights.55
At the same time that courts were beginning to consider prisoners’
complaints, the inmate population exploded. Professor Franklin
Zimring has described how America’s incarceration rate began to rise in
the mid1970s, accelerated in the mid1980s with the “War on Drugs,”
and continued to expand in the 1990s as prison terms lengthened due to
changes in sentence structure and the enactment of recidivism
(commonly known as “threestrikes”) statutes.56 Today, this thirtyyear
trend has produced the world’s highest incarceration rate.57
In 1996, in the midst of America’s prison boom, Congress enacted
the PLRA.58 The stated purpose of the PLRA was to reduce frivolous
inmate litigation and overreaching by federal courts.59 In some
measure the legislation was a reaction to perceived judicial activism.60
However, the PLRA also was a response to a purported “deluge” of pro
se inmate filings, in large part attributable to “the growing incarcerated
population.”61 It was accompanied by restrictions on habeas corpus
enacted in the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA),62 a statute which also has been described as a reaction to the
nation’s unprecedented use of incarceration.63
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.).
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (indicating that a regulation that infringes on
prisoners’ constitutional rights will be upheld if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests”). See generally Dei, supra note 43; Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 53, at 1219
(discussing how, before enactment of the PLRA, courts “began responding to arguments in favor
of changing the courts’ role” in prison litigation).
56 Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Policy and Penal Legislation in Recent American Experience,
58 STAN. L. REV. 323, 33135 (2005).
57 THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES: THIRTYTHREE
CONSECUTIVE YEARS OF GROWTH (2006), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/
pdfs/1044.pdf.
58 Zimring, supra note 56, at 33135.
59 Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 40, at 158687.
60 James B. Jacobs, Prison Reform Amid the Ruins of Prisoners’ Rights, in THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT 18485 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004); see also Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 53 at
1219.
61 Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 40, at 158687; see also Roosevelt, supra note 13
at 1777 (“[W]hat the United States was really experiencing was an epidemic of incarceration, of
which increased litigation was merely a symptom.”).
62 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Foreward, in RANDY HERTZ & J AMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE at v (2001) (“AEDPA undertook to make sweeping
changes in federal habeas corpus procedure.”).
63 See generally Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring
Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 339 (2006).
54
55
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Passed hastily and with scant legislative history, the PLRA
represented a moment when state attorneys general were able to take
advantage of antiprisoner and antiactivist court sentiment—as well as
a Republicancontrolled Congress—to curtail access to courts.64 It has
been described by Professors Mark Tushnet and Larry Yackle as a
“symbolic statute”—one passed so that legislators can “tell their
constituents that they have done something about a problem,”—but with
all too “real consequences.”65 The PLRA was one formal, legal
component of the incarceration boom of the mid1990s, which
culminated in what Professor Jonathan Simon has described in a
forthcoming paper as “a system whose not so unintended effect is to
cast [young men and women] into a permanently diminished
citizenship.”66
The Honorable Jon O. Newman, Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, has described the PLRA lobby
as follows: “Laboring under the burdens of having to respond to
thousands of lawsuits, most of which are frivolous, the attorneys general
of the states adopted the tactic of condemning all prisoner litigation as
frivolous.”67 The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG)
compiled a “Top Ten Frivolous Filings List,” containing the infamous
“chunky peanut butter” case, in which a prisoner sued after his inmate
account was charged for the wrong kind of peanut butter.68 As Chief
Judge Newman has pointed out, NAAG’s “poster child” cases may not
actually have been so frivolous, and, if they were frivolous, were not so
typical of prison litigation.69 Nonetheless the examples did the work
that the state officials intended—the PLRA passed.
The statute created several requirements affecting institutional
litigation by incarcerated persons.70 These include provisions creating
restrictions on prospective relief71 and restrictions on prisoner release
orders,72 as well as provisions providing for the termination of consent
64
See generally Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 40, at 155859. See also Roosevelt,
supra note 13, at 177778; Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 53, at 1222.
65 Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 53, at 23, 85.
66 Jonathan Simon, Rise of the Carceral State 3738 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
67 Hon. Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520 (1996).
68 Id. at 52021.
69 Id. at 522.
70 See generally MICHAEL R. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 16 (3d ed. 2006).
71 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000) (“[P]rospective relief . . . shall extend no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right . . . .”); see MUSHLIN, supra note 70, at §
16:3.
72 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3). Prisoner release orders may be granted only by a threejudge
panel; only once the defendants have had “a reasonable amount of time to comply with previous
court orders;” and only if the court finds that “crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a
Federal right” and that “no other relief will remedy the violation.” Id.; see MUSHLIN, supra note
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decrees and injunctions.73 Another set of PLRA sections were designed
to reduce frivolous litigation by individual pro se prisoners, including a
provision for screening of complaints,74 a “three strikes” rule barring
future filings once a prisoner has filed three that were “frivolous,
malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted,”75 and a mandate that even indigent prisoners must pay filing
fees out of their inmate accounts.76 A final set of PLRA provisions
addressed various perceived abuses of prison litigation, barring recovery
for mental or emotional injury without a prior showing of a physical
injury,77 and limiting attorney’s fees.78
Although the statute faced scholarly criticism and legal challenges
when it was passed,79 it was upheld.80 In the ensuing years, the PLRA
appears to have restricted inmate litigation. Professor Schlanger, who
analyzed federal court filings in her 2003 article Inmate Litigation, has
written: “The statute has been highly successful in reducing litigation,
triggering a fortythree percent decline over five years, notwithstanding
the simultaneous twentythree percent increase in the incarcerated
population.”81
By creating new procedural requirements, however, the PLRA also
has generated many legal issues,82 some of which echo earlier debates
about the proper role of federal court review of prisoners’ complaints.
The exhaustion requirement, in particular, has produced significant
litigation. Of the six U.S. Supreme Court decisions involving the

70, at §§ 16:4, 16:6.
73 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1) and (b)(3). Judgments are automatically terminated in two years
unless the court makes written findings that “relief is narrowly drawn,” “extends no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right; and is the least intrusive means necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right.” Id.; see also MUSHLIN, supra note 70, at § 16:5.
74 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1); see MUSHLIN, supra note 70, at
§§ 16:12, 16:16, 16:17.
75 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see MUSHLIN, supra note 70, at §§ 16:12, 16:16.
76 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); see MUSHLIN, supra note 70, at §§ 16:12, 16:14.
77 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a
jail, prison or other correctional facility for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury.”); see MUSHLIN, supra note 70, at § 16:10.
78 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d); see MUSHLIN, supra note 70, at § 16:22.
79 See generally Roosevelt, supra note 13 at 1779. See, e.g., William C. Collins, Bumps in
the Road to the Courthouse: The Supreme Court and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 24 PACE
L. REV. 651 (2004); Cindy Chen, Note, The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Doing Away
with More Than Just Chunky Peanut Butter, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 203 (2004); Lynn S.
Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion Requirement: What It Means
and What Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials Can Learn From It, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
483 (2001); Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress and the
Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229 (1998).
80 See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000); see Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 1779;
Herman, supra note 79, at 1290.
81 Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 40, at 1694.
82 Chen, supra note 79, at 218.
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PLRA,83 four have dealt with the exhaustion requirement,84 including
Woodford and Jones.
The exhaustion requirement provides: “No action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.”85 The PLRA exhaustion requirement amended an
earlier exhaustion requirement contained in the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), which was enacted in 1980.86
Under CRIPA, however, the exhaustion requirement “was in large part
discretionary; it could be ordered only if the State’s prison grievance
system met specified federal standards, and even then, only if, in the
particular case, the court believed the requirement ‘appropriate and in
the interests of justice.’”87 A district court could stay a suit for up to
180 days while a prisoner exhausted available “plain, speedy, and
effective administrative remedies.”88 The PLRA altered the nature of
the CRIPA exhaustion requirement—among other things, changing it
from discretionary to mandatory, eliminating the stay provision, and
removing the requirement that administrative remedies be “plain,
speedy, and effective.”89
Although exhaustion requirements exist in administrative law and
habeas corpus,90 the meaning of such a provision in the civil rights
context is far from clear, and has been heavily litigated. During some
periods of the past two years, the exhaustion requirement has generated
several district court opinions each day, ultimately producing a number
of circuit splits. These splits, in turn, produced decisions in Woodford
v. Ngo and Jones v. Bock.
The first wave of PLRA exhaustion litigation to reach the Supreme
Court, five years after the Act’s passage, addressed the scope of the
provision. In Booth v. Churner the Supreme Court concluded that
prisoners were required to exhaust claims for money damages, even
when such relief was not available through the prison grievance
system.91 The following year, in Porter v. Nussle, the Supreme Court
83 Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 323 (1999); Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000); Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.
Ct. 2378, 2378 (2006); Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 910 (2007).
84 Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2378; Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 910.
85 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000); see MUSHLIN, supra note 70, § 16:9.
86 94 Stat. 352, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1994) (repealed 1996); see Porter, 534 U.S.
at 523.
87 Porter, 534 U.S. at 523.
88 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994) (repealed 1996).
89 Porter, 534 U.S. at 52324.
90 Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 1774 (“Exhaustion requirements are familiar to federal
judges.”).
91 Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 74041 (2001).
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concluded that “prison conditions” cases subject to the exhaustion
requirement included excessive force cases, a group that the Second
Circuit had carved out of the PLRA’s ambit.92 Justice Ginsburg, writing
for a unanimous Court, said, “we hold that the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they
allege excessive force or some other wrong.”93
Once Booth and Porter defined the scope and application of the
statute, the skirmishing turned to questions about the procedures for
administering the exhaustion doctrine. How does a prisoner satisfy the
PLRA exhaustion requirement? What if a grievance is untimely? How
specific must a grievance be to satisfy exhaustion? What if one claim is
exhausted, while others are not exhausted? And who bears the burden
of demonstrating and proving exhaustion? These questions, among
others, were the focus of the most recent round of PLRA litigation.
They are gatekeeper questions; they directly affect whether prisoners’
federal claims may be brought to court. The way in which the Court is
answering these questions has farreaching implications for the role
played by the civil rights statute in the prison and jail context.
Decided in the 2005 term, Woodford is the most important of the
cases interpreting the exhaustion requirement. The prisoner in
Woodford, a California inmate, failed to file a grievance within fifteen
working days of the action being challenged, as required by the
California regulation.94 The Ninth Circuit concluded that, because the
prisoner was no longer able to submit a grievance to the California
Department of Corrections (CDOC), the administrative remedy was not
“available” to him, and so he had exhausted within the meaning of the
statute.95 The Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicted with decisions of the
Seventh,96 Tenth,97 Third,98 and Eleventh Circuits;99 it was consistent
with the Sixth Circuit.100 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
Porter, 534 U.S. at 532, reversing Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id.
94 126 S. Ct. at 2384.
95 Id. at 2384 (citing Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 62930 (9th Cir. 2005)).
96 Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that “[t]o exhaust
administrative remedies, a person must follow the rules governing filing and prosecution of a
claim”).
97 Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 118586 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
PLRA “contains a procedural default concept within its exhaustion requirement”).
98 Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that “Congress’s policy
objectives will be served by interpreting § 1997(e)(a)’s exhaustion requirement to include a
procedural default component”).
99 Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding “that the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement does contain a procedural default component”).
100 Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 733 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that “a prisoner who has
presented his or her grievance through one complete round of the prison process has exhausted
the available administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), regardless of whether the
92
93
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reversed.101 While Woodford itself dealt with an untimely grievance,
the language of the opinion suggests that the procedural default rule that
it announced is not limited to time deadlines.
In an opinion written by Justice Alito, the Court concluded that the
PLRA required compliance with all procedural requirements of an
inmate grievance system to avoid default, writing that “the PLRA
exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion.”102 It analogized to
principles of administrative review of federal agency decisions, and to
habeas doctrine, in which federal courts review decisions of state
criminal court systems. Administrative exhaustion, the Court reasoned,
gives an agency a chance to correct its own mistakes and promotes
efficient resolution of controversies.103 “Proper exhaustion demands
compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural
rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without
imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings,” the
Court explained.104 Federal habeas doctrine, the Court wrote, contains a
“substantively similar” requirement, which bars a prisoner from
obtaining relief unless he has “properly presented his or her claims
through one ‘complete round of the State’s established appellate review
process.’”105
Justice Breyer concurred but wrote separately to note that both
administrative law and habeas doctrine contain several exceptions to the
exhaustion requirement. “In my view,” Justice Breyer wrote, “on
remand the lower court should similarly consider any challenges that
petitioner may have concerning whether his case falls into a traditional
exception that the statute implicitly incorporates.”106 Justice Breyer
noted that these traditional administrative law exceptions include
futility, hardship, and an exemption for constitutional claims.107 He did
not acknowledge that an exception for constitutional claims would
swallow the rule in the PLRA context, since many prisoners’ claims are
constitutional. Nor did he attempt to reconcile the futility exception
with the Court’s decision in Booth, which concluded that prisoners must
exhaust administrative procedures even when they seek remedies like
money damages that are not available through the grievance system.108
Three Justices—Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg—dissented in
Woodford. Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens explained that,
prisoner complied with the grievance system’s procedural requirements”).
101 Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2384 (2006).
102 Id. at 2387.
103 Id. at 2385.
104 Id. at 2386.
105 Id. at 238687 (quoting O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)).
106 126 S. Ct. at 2393 (Breyer, J., concurring).
107 Id. at 2398.
108 Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 731 (2001).
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although the PLRA mandated exhaustion of administrative remedies, it
did not distinguish between denial on the merits and denial for some
other procedural reason.109 In other words, in the view of the dissenters,
if a court need not defer to prison officials’ decision on the merits of a
claim, why should it defer to their determination on procedural
grounds? The adoption of the procedural default requirement, Justice
Stevens wrote, is not required by the text of the statute, but rather
imposed by the majority of the Court.110
Justice Stevens criticized the majority’s reliance on “general
administrative law principles, which allow courts in certain
circumstances to impose procedural default sanctions as a matter of
federal common law.”111 “[W]hether a court should impose a
procedural default sanction for issues not properly exhausted in a prior
administrative proceeding depends on the degree to which the analogy
to normal adversarial litigation applies in a particular administrative
proceeding,” the dissent wrote.112 Prison grievance procedures do not
contain the kinds of procedural protections that exist in other agency
hearings, the dissent explained, let alone in state court criminal
proceedings. Inmate grievance procedures are quite short: “generally no
more than 15 days, and . . . in nine States . . . between 2 and 5 days.”113
“[B]ecause federal district court proceedings in prison condition
litigation bear no resemblance to appellate review of lower court
decisions,” the dissenters concluded, “the administrative law precedent
cited by the majority makes clear that we should not engraft a judge
made procedural default sanction into the PLRA.”114
In addition to relying on flawed analogies, Justice Stevens also
explained that the imposition of a procedural default requirement altered
the role of the civil rights vehicle in ways that could not have been
foreseen by Congress when the PLRA was enacted. “It is undisputed
that the PLRA does nothing to change the nature of the federal action
under § 1983,” he wrote.115 “[P]risoners who bring such actions after
exhausting their administrative remedies are entitled to de novo
proceedings in the federal district court without any deference (on
issues of law or fact) to any ruling in the administrative grievance

126 S. Ct. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2394 (“In the words of federal courts jurisprudence, the text of the PLRA does not
impose a waiver, or a procedural default, sanction, upon those prisoners who make such
procedural errors.”).
111 Id. at 2395.
112 Id. at 2398 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
113 Id. at 2402 (citing Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale
Law School as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006)
(No. 05416), 2006 WL 304573, at *613).
114 Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2402.
115
Id. at 2399.
109
110
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proceedings.”116 By analogizing to administrative law, the Woodford
majority placed state prison grievance procedures between prisoners
and the federal courts, flouting “the ‘very purpose of § 1983[, which]
was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as
guardians of the people’s federal rights.’”117 Moreover, Justice Stevens
noted that, while the PLRA was intended to reduce frivolous prison
litigation, the exhaustion requirement “bars litigation at random,
irrespective of whether a claim is meritorious or frivolous.”118
The cases consolidated in Jones v. Bock provide an important
indication of how Woodford will be implemented. In its brief in Jones,
the State of Michigan emphasized that judicial review of prisoners’
constitutional rights is a relatively recent innovation, and harkened back
to the “handsoff” doctrine. “For most of the history of the Republic
prisoners had few if any constitutional rights cognizable in the courts,”
the State wrote.119 Under “[t]he ‘handsoff’ doctrine,” which “prevailed
well into the middle part of the twentieth century,” the State continued,
“federal courts would rarely, if ever, review prisoner civil rights
complaints on the merits.”120
In a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court
confirmed that the PLRA is not a return to the “handsoff” doctrine. It
began by recognizing that prisoner filings “account for an outsized
share of filings” in federal district courts,121 but reaffirmed that the legal
system remains “committed to guaranteeing that prisoner claims of
illegal conduct by their custodians are fairly handled according to
law.”122 The PLRA, including its exhaustion requirement, was intended
to produce “fewer and better prisoner suits,” the Court explained.123
The Jones Court turned first to the question of “whether it falls to
the prisoner to plead and demonstrate exhaustion in the complaint, or to
the defendant to raise lack of exhaustion as an affirmative defense.”124
It concluded that the statute’s silence on the subject “is strong evidence
that the usual practice should be followed, and the usual practice under
the Federal Rules is to recognize exhaustion as an affirmative
defense.”125 The Court reiterated its conclusion from a number of
Id. at 2399.
Id. at 2396 n.5 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972)).
118 Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2401.
119 Brief of Respondents, Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007) (Nos. 057058 and 057142),
2006 WL 2726076, at *22.
120 Id. at *2223.
121 Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 914 (2007). But see Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra
note 40, at 1576 (demonstrating that prisoners’ rate of court filings is not higher than the general
population when both state and federal court filings are counted).
122 Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 914.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 919.
125 Id.
116
117
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recent cases that “courts should generally not depart from the usual
practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of perceived policy
concerns.”126 The Court rejected the State’s arguments that the PLRA
screening requirement—which permits district courts to dismiss
complaints that are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted—transformed exhaustion into a pleading
requirement.127 “The argument that screening would be more effective
if exhaustion had to be shown in the complaint proves too much,” the
Court said.128 “[T]he same could be said with respect to any affirmative
defense.”129
The Jones court next rejected the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that
the prisoners’ suits had to be dismissed because they “had not identified
in their initial grievances each defendant they later sued.”130 The Court
concluded that the PLRA itself contained no such requirement. It
explained that whether a prisoner must name defendants in his initial
grievance is determined by looking to the prison grievance policies. “In
Woodford,” the Court explained, “we held that to properly exhaust
administrative remedies prisoners must ‘complete the administrative
review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,’ . . .
rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance
process itself.”131 At the time the prisoners in the Williams and Walton
suits had filed their grievances, the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) had not required them to identify specific defendants.132 The
Court explained: “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply
with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and
claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA,
that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”133
Finally, the Jones court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s socalled “total
exhaustion” rule. The Court concluded that the language of the PLRA
exhaustion provision—“no action shall be brought”—was “boilerplate
language” used in other areas, such as statutes of limitation.134 “[S]uch
language has not been thought to lead to the dismissal of an entire
action if a single claim fails to meet the pertinent standards.”135 The
Court continued: “[W]e have never heard of an entire complaint being
thrown out simply because one of several discrete claims was barred by

126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id.
Id. at 921.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 922.
Id. (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2378 (2006)).
Id. at 923.
Id.
Id. at 924.
Id.
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the statute of limitations, and it is hard to imagine what purpose such a
rule would serve.”136 The Jones court examined the habeas analogy,
and noted that there might be important differences between habeas
petitions and civil rights suits that would militate against a total
exhaustion rule in the § 1983 context.137 However, it concluded, such
differences were of no moment because, even in habeas, “a court
presented with a mixed habeas petition typically ‘allows the petitioner
to delete the unexhausted claims and to proceed with the exhausted
claims.’”138
In conclusion, the Jones court said that not even the pressures of
large numbers of prisoner suits could justify judiciallycreated
procedures meant to block court access, in the absence of statutory or
rulebased authority. “We are not insensitive to the challenges faced by
the lower federal courts in managing their dockets and attempting to
separate, when it comes to prisoner suits, not so much wheat from chaff
as needles from haystacks,”139 the Jones Court said. “We once again
reiterate, however . . . that adopting different and more onerous pleading
rules to deal with particular categories of cases should be done through
established rulemaking procedures, and not on a casebycase basis by
the courts.”140
The combined message of Woodford and Jones is that it is the rules
of prison grievance policies that will determine when—and if—
incarcerated prisoners are able to seek relief in court. Jones signals to
lower courts eager to unburden themselves of prisoner cases that the
PLRA is not carte blanche to “trap the unwary pro se prisoner.”141
Nonetheless, the namethedefendants portion of the Jones decision
makes clear that if a prison system institutes rules requiring plaintiffs to
identify defendants in their initial grievances, an inmate’s failure to
comply with those rules might constitute a failure to “properly
exhaust.”142 Accordingly, authority is shifted to prison grievance
systems: if they have short deadlines, like in Woodford, or require
detailed complaints, many prisoners will have difficulty getting into
court.

Id.
Id. at 92425.
138 Id. at 913.
139 Id. at 926.
140 Id.
141 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 487 (2000) (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520
(1982)).
142 Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 913.
136
137
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II. THE “HABEASIFICATION” OF CIVIL RIGHTS: HOW THE PLRA
EXHAUSTION CASES ALTER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Woodford’s jurisdictionstripping effect operates through court
imposed limitations on prisoners’ ability to use § 1983 to seek redress
against state officials for federal law violations. In adopting procedural
default, the Woodford majority, “change[d] the nature of the federal
action under § 1983.”143 Three years prior to Woodford, Professor
Kermit Roosevelt identified this issue in his article, Exhaustion Under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act. “Before the PLRA,” Professor
Roosevelt wrote, “a § 1983 suit was quite clearly an independent federal
cause of action, with no relation to any state judicial or administrative
proceeding.”144 “What must be decided,” he explained, “is whether
Congress intended the PLRA exhaustion requirement to convert this
independent action into either appellate review of prison grievance
proceedings (the administrative model) or collateral attack on such
proceedings (the habeas model).”145 He concluded that, “[n]othing in
the PLRA suggests that federal courts hearing § 1983 suits should
review or defer to the results of prison grievance proceedings, a feature
that one would expect to find on either a collateral attack or an appellate
review approach.”146
Professor Roosevelt explained that prison grievance proceedings
“are insufficiently judicial in nature to warrant preclusive effect”147—
“[g]rievance proceedings may be nonadversarial; they may not observe
rules of evidence in creating a record; they may create no record at
all.”148 “[T]he administrative proceeding may produce no reviewable
findings, or no relevant ones; moreover, there is no guarantee that
whatever findings do result will be the product of a procedure that
comports with federal due process standards.”149 And he warned that
procedural default “requires . . . dismissal of many inmate suits without
regard to their merits,”150 a troubling prospect given that “there are also
real abuses that take place within the prison system.”151
Professor Roosevelt’s analysis highlights a number of important
points, which we expand on here. The first is that the procedural default
rule announced in Woodford changes the role of the civil rights statute
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 910, 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 1806.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1807.
Id.
Id. at 1806.
Id. at 1775.
Id. at 1776.
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in our federal system and curtails the ability to hale abusers into federal
court. It makes 42 U.S.C. § 1983—historically a vehicle for holding
local officials accountable for federal constitutional violations—more
like habeas corpus,152 a vehicle in which federal courts generally review
only claims that have been presented first to state courts, in accordance
with state rules.153 Professor Roosevelt’s second observation is that this
habeaslike deference to prison grievance procedures is inappropriate
because such procedures do not provide adequate due process
protections.154
In this section and the one that follows, we elaborate on these two
criticisms in turn, drawing on empirical support from a survey of
grievance policies conducted by the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services
Organization of the Yale Law School (LSO) as part of its amicus brief
in Woodford. In the final section, we address the Woodford rule’s
implications and the heart of Professor Roosevelt’s critique—that the
imposition of a judiciallycreated procedural default rule will allow
“real abuses” to go unchecked.155
Woodford’s effect on § 1983 is easier to understand when viewed
in the context of the statute’s history. In its landmark opinion in
Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court explained that the statute that is
now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was initially passed as the Ku Klux Klan Act of
April 20, 1871, and was one of the means that Congress sought to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.156 President
Grant and members of Congress were concerned about “lawless
conditions” existing in the South at that time.157 As Justice Douglas
explains in Monroe: “It was not the unavailability of state remedies but
the failure of certain States to enforce the laws with an equal hand that
furnished the powerful momentum behind this ‘force bill.’”158
After reviewing the debates that presaged the statute’s enactment,
the Monroe Court concluded:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was
to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might
not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights,
privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
might be denied by the state agencies.159
152
153

Id. at 179899.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000). See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 62, at §§ 20.2c

& 23.
Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 1807.
Id. at 177576.
156 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
157 Id. at 174.
158 Id. at 17475.
159 365 U.S. at 180. Mr. Lowe of Kansas said: “While murder is stalking abroad in disguise,
while whippings and lynchings and banishment have been visited upon unoffending American
154
155
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The Monroe Court noted that proponents of the Act stated explicitly that
they were motivated by a desire to secure minority rights. Mr. Hoar of
Massachusetts had explained during the debates that the statute was to
“insure that under no temptation of party spirit, under no political
excitement, under no jealousy of race or caste, will the majority either
in numbers or strength in any State seek to deprive the remainder of the
population of their civil rights.”160
Because the civil rights statute is supposed to provide a federal
forum for the vindication of federal constitutional rights, the Supreme
Court has held that litigants are not required to exhaust state
remedies.161 In 1982, in Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of
Florida, an employment discrimination suit brought against a state
university under the civil rights statute, Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, confirmed that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not generally require
exhaustion of state administrative remedies as a prerequisite to filing
suit.162 In reaching this conclusion, the Court discussed the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. “The Civil Rights Act of 1871,
along with the Fourteenth Amendment it was enacted to enforce, were
crucial ingredients in the basic alteration of our federal system
accomplished during the Reconstruction Era,” wrote Justice Marshall.163
“[T]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts
between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal
rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of
state law, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.”164
One of the themes that the Court identified in the debates was “the
belief of the 1871 Congress that the state authorities had been unable or
unwilling to protect the constitutional rights of individuals or to punish
those who violated these rights.”165
The Patsy Court noted that Congress had enacted a “narrow
exception to the noexhaustion rule” in CRIPA, requiring adults
convicted of crimes to exhaust administrative remedies in some
circumstances, provided that those remedies were deemed “plain,
citizens, the local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper
corrective. . . . Immunity is given to crime, and the records of the public tribunals are searched in
vain for any evidence of effective redress.” 365 U.S. at 47778. Mr. Beatty of Ohio offered
similar comment: “[C]ertain States have denied to persons within their jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. The proof on this point is voluminous and unquestionable. Men were
murdered, houses were burned, women were outraged, men were scouraged, and officers of the
law shot down; and the State made no successful effort to bring the guilty to punishment or afford
protection or redress to the outraged and innocent. The State, from lack of power or inclination,
practically denied the equal protection of the law to these persons.” Id. at 175.
160 365 U.S. at 18283.
161 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994).
162 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).
163 Id. at 503.
164 Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
165 Id. at 505.
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speedy, and effective.”166
In adopting the CRIPA exhaustion
requirement, Justice Marshall wrote: “Congress clearly expressed its
belief that a decision to require exhaustion for certain § 1983 actions
would work a change in the law.”167 The Patsy Court concluded
however that, “[a] judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would be
inconsistent with Congress’ decision to adopt § 1997e and would usurp
policy judgments that Congress has reserved for itself.”168
In enacting the PLRA, Congress intended to strengthen the CRIPA
exhaustion requirement—by making exhaustion mandatory and doing
away with the requirement that administrative procedures be “plain,
speedy, and effective” to require exhaustion.169 The Woodford
dissenters argue, however, that procedural default is an extra judicial
gloss that is not required by the PLRA.170 The dissenters assert that it is
“judicially imposed”—much like the rule rejected by the Court in
Patsy,171 and much like the habeas doctrine of procedural default.172
Adding a procedural default component to a simple exhaustion
requirement has a real effect on access to court. A requirement of
simple exhaustion—that prisoners must present their grievances to
corrections officials before these claims are adjudicated in federal
court—guarantees prison officials the initial opportunity to address
prisoners’ complaints, without curtailing prisoners’ ultimate ability to
go to court. Indeed, as the Woodford dissenters point out, “[T]he PLRA
has already had the effect of reducing the quantity of prison litigation,
without the need for an extrastatutory procedural default sanction.”173
The extra judicial imposition of procedural default, however, goes
further, by allowing corrections officials, based on their determination
that a grievance is technically or procedurally deficient, to ensure that
claims never see the light of day.174
The doctrinal implication of Woodford is that, if federalstate
relations were mapped on a grid, the civil rights vehicle would move
closer to the position occupied by habeas, at least in the prison and jail
context. In habeas corpus, for comity reasons, federal review is
restricted by state rules and procedures, through the doctrines of
Id. at 50910.
Id. at 508.
168 Id. (emphasis added).
169 See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001).
170 Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2398 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171 Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508.
172 Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2399 n.7.
173 Id. at 2400.
174 Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 1776 (warning that if procedural default is adopted “we should
expect grievance systems to become more complex and unforgiving,” because “[p]rison
administrators, who generally have control over the structure and timing of prison grievance
procedures, can hardly be faulted for taking advantage of a technique handed them by the federal
courts”).
166
167
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exhaustion and procedural default.175 Federal courts generally will not
consider a criminal defendant’s federal constitutional challenges to his
conviction unless they first have been presented to the state courts.176
Courts have adopted these procedural default rules in the habeas context
to protect the primacy of state criminal proceedings—to make “the state
trial on the merits the ‘main event’ . . . rather than a ‘tryout on the road’
for what will later be the determinative federal habeas hearing.”177 To
be sure, in civil rights suits, federal courts need not defer to prison
officials’ findings of fact or conclusions of law on the merits, as they
must defer to state courts’ determinations in habeas.178 However, PLRA
exhaustion has made barriers to federal courts in the civil rights context
more equivalent to those in habeas.
While the Woodford Court analogized both to administrative law
and habeas corpus doctrine,179 it is habeas that is the usual alternative to
prisoners’ civil rights suits. Habeas corpus and the civil rights statute
have been described as “the two most fertile sources of federalcourt
prisoner litigation.”180 The dividing line between civil rights suits and
habeas is heavily litigated and has resulted in numerous Supreme Court
decisions.181 Litigants tend to prefer civil rights suits to habeas. Habeas
is encumbered by numerous procedural disadvantages, including
restricted discovery,182 arbitrary forum limitations,183 and, previously,
more burdensome exhaustion requirements. This last difference used to
be particularly salient. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, decided in 1973, the
Supreme Court explained:
[I]f a remedy under the Civil Rights Act is available, a plaintiff
need not first seek redress in a state forum. . . . If, on the other
hand, habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy in these
circumstances, then a plaintiff cannot seek the intervention of a
federal court until he has first sought and been denied relief in
the state courts, if a state remedy is available and adequate.184
The reinforcement of the PLRA has made exhaustion in prison
civil rights cases more like exhaustion in the habeas context. In
175 O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 84247 (1999); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518
(1982); see also Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 178999.
176 Rose, 455 U.S. at 518; see also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 62, at § 23.
177 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
178 Cf. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006).
179 126 S. Ct. at 238587.
180 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994).
181 See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974); Heck, 512 U.S. at 477; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Wallace v. Kato, 127 S.
Ct. 1091 (2007).
182 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290 (1969).
183 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); see Giovanna Shay & Timothy P. O’Toole,
Wilkinson v. Dotson: How a “Boring” Parole Case Can Reduce Government ForumShopping,
29 CHAMPION 38 (2005).
184 411 U.S. 475, 477 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
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Wilkinson v. Dotson, decided in 2005, the Court allowed certain
challenges to parole procedures to go forward as a civil rights suit.
Rejecting the government’s argument that the suit should have been
brought as a habeas action, to require prior exhaustion of state court
remedies, the Court wrote, citing the PLRA and Porter v. Nussle, “we
see no reason for moving the line these cases draw—particularly since
Congress has already strengthened the requirement that prisoners
exhaust state administrative remedies as a precondition to any § 1983
action.”185 In the courts’ view, the PLRA exhaustion requirement
functioned in a manner similar to habeas exhaustion.
As Professor Roosevelt has pointed out, however, it is
inappropriate to import into the PLRA context rules designed to respect
the authority of state courts in criminal trials.186 Habeas procedural
default rules are designed to promote finality in part because, at least in
theory, state court criminal proceedings provide due process as required
by the federal constitution.187 As Justice Rehnquist explained in
Wainwright, “the trial of a criminal case in state court [is] a decisive and
portentous event . . . [T]he accused is in the courtroom, the jury is in
the box, the judge is on the bench, and the witnesses, having been
subpoenaed and duly sworn, await their turn to testify.”188 By contrast,
prison grievance proceedings lack all of the procedural protections of
criminal trials, and they are hardly the “main event” in civil rights
litigation.189 In fact, after the PLRA, grievance procedures no longer
even have to be “plain, speedy, and effective.”190 Despite the
differences between prison grievance systems and other judicial and
administrative proceedings, the Supreme Court has analogized to habeas
and administrative law doctrine in its PLRA exhaustion cases. The next
section explains in greater detail why these analogies are misplaced.
III. MISPLACED ANALOGIES: HABEAS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Woodford majority opinion relies heavily on analogies to
administrative law and habeas doctrine. However, prison grievance
procedures differ in important respects from state court criminal
proceedings and other kinds of agency proceedings. These differences
are demonstrated by a survey of prison and jail grievance policies that
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 84 (2005); see also Shay & O’Toole, supra note 183.
Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 180607.
187 Id. See also infra note 192, describing incorporation of federal constitutional protections
and application to state court proceedings. We also thank Professor Dan Kahan for this
observation.
188 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
189 Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 1811 (contrasting Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 90).
190 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
185
186
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the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law
School (LSO) clinic conducted as amicus in Woodford and Jones.
Administrative proceedings in many kinds of agencies are
governed by the Administrative Procedures Act and minimum
requirements of due process. One study has reported: “of 42 agency
programs administered through use of informal adjudication . . . most
agencies use procedures that include four procedural safeguards: (1)
notice of issues presented; (2) an opportunity to present data and
arguments either in written or oral form; (3) a decision by a neutral
decisionmaker; and (4) a statement of reasons for the decision.”191
Obviously, the same is true of state court criminal trials, which must
adhere to numerous federal constitutional protections.192 This is not
true for prison grievance procedures. It is difficult to make definitive
statements about correctional grievance policies because such policies
are often unpublished, available only from the corrections agencies
themselves, and revised frequently. However, the LSO clinic amicus
brief in Woodford attempted a nationwide survey of grievance policies
for illustrative purposes, and succeeded in obtaining a policy (not
necessarily the most current) from each of the fifty states, as well as a
couple of sheriffs’ departments and a department of juvenile justice.
Although prison grievance procedures may be enacted as state law
or regulation,193 they are often mere administrative directives adopted
by a corrections agency itself.194
Grievance systems can be
administered, particularly in the initial stages, by line corrections
staff.195 Even at later stages of the process, they are controlled by the

191 See RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.1, at 561 (4th ed. 2002)
(citing Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739
(1976)).
192 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, 1 CRIM. PROC. § 2.6
(discussing doctrine of selective incorporation of federal constitutional rights); see, e.g., Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
(Eight Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963) (Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
(right to trial by jury); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront opposing
witnesses); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (Fifth Amendment prohibition on double
jeopardy).
193 See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3084.1 (2007); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 504.10
(2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 701.5 (2006).
194 See Appendix to Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale
Law School as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006)
(No. 05416), 2006 WL 304573.
195 See, e.g., CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION (DOC), ADMINISTRATIVE
DIRECTIVE 9.6 (effective 3/5/03) (grievances must be preceded by an attempt at “informal
resolution” directed at “the appropriate unit Department Head or employee”), available at
http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0906.pdf.
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corrections officials who may well be potential defendants in any
lawsuit resulting from the incidents at issue,196 and who may also be
colleagues or former coworkers of the defendants. In Cleavinger v.
Saxner, the Supreme Court described the lack of independence of prison
administrative hearing officers in a case involving disciplinary hearings,
which holds true in the grievance context as well:
Surely, the members of the committee, unlike a federal or state
judge, are not “independent”; to say that they are is to ignore reality.
They are not professional hearing officers, as are administrative law
judges. They are, instead, prison officials, albeit no longer of the
rank and file, temporarily diverted from their usual duties. . . . They
are employees of the Bureau of Prisons and they are the direct
subordinates of the warden who reviews their decision. They work
with the fellow employee who lodges the charge against the inmate
upon whom they sit in judgment. The credibility determination they
make often is one between a coworker and an inmate. They thus are
under obvious pressure to resolve a disciplinary dispute in favor of
the institution and their fellow employee. . . . It is the old situational
problem of the relationship between the keeper and the kept, a
relationship that hardly is conducive to a truly adjudicatory
performance.197

Grievance system rules and procedures are supposed to provide
informal and summary resolution of complaints, not fullfledged
litigation of federal claims. Professor Branham has pointed out that
many grievance systems do not fulfill even their ostensible function of
problemsolving very well, because they often do not provide
meaningful relief that would obviate the need for litigation, such as
money damages.198 But setting aside whether grievance procedures
actually solve problems, their formal structures indicate that they are not
akin to the type of administrative or judicial adjudication in which
procedural default generally applies.
A minority of states provide for hearings in grievance
procedures,199 but even these proceedings may not generate any
Id. (providing that highest level of review is by DOC Commissioner “or designee”).
474 U.S. 193, 20304 (1985).
198 Branham, supra note 79, at 521.
199 The LSO survey identified about a dozen jurisdictions that provide for a hearing in which
an inmate can present evidence directly to a decisionmaker. Not all of these systems mandate
hearings in every case; some are discretionary. See, e.g., DELAWARE BUREAU OF PRISONS,
PROCEDURE NO. 4.4 (revised 5/15/98); HAWAII DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, POLICY NO.
493.12.03 (effective 4/3/92); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 504.830; IOWA DEPT. OF
CORRECTIONS, POLICY NO. INV46 (revised January 2005); KENTUCKY DEP’T OF
CORRECTIONS, POLICY NO. 14.6 (effective 1/4/05), MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY & CORR.
SERVS. § 12.07.01.08 (effective 11/14/05); MISSOURI DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL
SERVICES POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL PROCEDURE NO. IS82.1 (effective 1/15/92); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 701.7 (2005); SOUTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, GA
01.12 (issued 11.1.04); TENNESSEE DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, INDEX NO. 501.01 (effective
196
197
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record.200 A complete grievance proceeding often consists of little more
than a series of forms that a prisoner submits, which are returned with
the corrections officials’ responses at the bottom. For example, one
Connecticut prisoner’s complaint about inadequate mental health
treatment was answered with the oneline response: “Adequate mental
health care is provided to all inmates at [the facility].”201
Inmate grievance procedures are characterized by multiple, short
deadlines, which make the process even less analogous to a state court
proceeding.202 Of the policies surveyed by the LSO amicus, more than
a dozen provided for less than fourteen days for the filing of the first
grievance.203 More than thirty of the policies reviewed in the LSO brief
required a prisoner to attempt informal resolution before filing the first
official grievance, and the deadline for informal resolution was as short
as two days in some jurisdictions.204 Some jurisdictions require a
prisoner to attempt informal resolution within the time allowed for the
filing of the first official grievance, and some of these permit prison
officials a certain number of days in which to respond to the informal
complaint, which further consumes a prisoner’s time for filing.205 All of
the policies that were reviewed require prisoners to pursue at least one
level of appeal; the time limits for the appeal were as short as three to
five days in many instances.206 In a prison environment, in which
movement is obviously restricted and grievance forms may be difficult
to obtain, such short deadlines can create high hurdles.
The PLRA applies not only to state prisons, but also to city and
county jails and detention centers, and, currently, to juvenile
facilities.207 It is even more difficult to obtain policies for these local
subdivisions. However, the survey included a couple of sheriff
department policies, and both of these allowed only a few days for the
filing of grievances—five working days in one case, and seven in the

5/1/04); UTAH DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS DIVISION MANUAL
(revised 7/1/03).
200 Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 1806; see also Brief for the A.C.L.U. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007) (Nos. 057085 and 057142), 2006
WL 2364683, at *1516 & n.19.
201 Brief for the A.C.L.U. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Jones v. Bock, 127 S.
Ct. 910 (2007) (Nos. 057058 and 057142), 2006 WL 2364683, at n.19.
202 Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (No. 05416),
2006 WL 304573, at *613.
203 Id. at *6.
204 Id. at *78.
205 Id. at *89.
206 Id. at *1112.
207 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000); see Rapa, supra note 27, at 271. Some courts have held that
they also apply to drug treatment facilities. See Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170 (2d
Cir. 2006); Witze v. Femal, 376 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2004).
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other.208 The North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention policy required children to appeal denials of
their grievances within twentyfour hours.209
It is not only short deadlines that separate prison grievance
procedures from other kinds of judicial or administrative proceedings.
Correctional grievance policies sometimes state explicitly that their role
is to solve problems, not litigate legal claims.210 Grievance policies
never require a prisoner to spell out legal claims, and they often lack the
procedural protections usually associated with adversarial litigation,
such as formal discovery mechanisms and evidentiary hearings.211 They
usually require only a short and plain statement of the complaint,
sometimes instructing inmates to state their grievance briefly and to
avoid surplusage.212 They are informal, nonadjudicative proceedings;
not at all like the state court proceedings that garner deference in the
habeas context.
Although correctional grievance systems lack many formal
procedural protections, they nearly uniformly provide for investigation.
This makes sense, because it is easier for prison officials to investigate
complaints than it is for inmates to do so.213 The widespread provision
of investigation suggests that submitting a grievance is more akin to
lodging a complaint with the police than with filing a complaint in
court; while a grievance initiates an investigative process, it is not
intended to instigate adjudication of legal claims. 214
Despite these summary procedures, the rule announced in
Woodford allows prison officials to “ding” even meritorious lawsuits
due to a missed deadline or other procedural misstep—regardless of the
merits of the underlying claim.215 And it creates perverse incentives for
corrections officials to deny claims on procedural rather than
substantive grounds, thereby insulating their decisions from judicial
scrutiny.216
208 Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (No. 05416),
2006 WL 304573, at *12.
209 Id. at *13.
210 Brief for the A.C.L.U. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Jones v. Bock, 127 S.
Ct. 910 (2007) (Nos. 057085 and 057142), 2006 WL 2364683, nn.1314.
211 Id. at *1516.
212 Id. at n.6.
213 Id. at *12.
214 John Boston and Professor Lynn Branham each pointed out that a procedural default rule
may actually frustrate investigations, by creating incentives to create complex rules, rather than
simply investigate quickly and solve problems. See infra notes 22336.
215 Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2401 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216 Brief for the A.C.L.U. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Woodford v. Ngo,
126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (No. 05416), 2006 WL 284226, at *2728; see also Margo Schlanger &
Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Prisons: The Case for Amending the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, at 8 (March 2007) (issue brief distributed by the American
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In fact, the procedural default rule creates incentives for
corrections officials to develop ever more complex procedures, to make
it more difficult for prisoners to sue them successfully. As the amicus
brief filed by the American Civil Liberties Union and other amici in
Jones pointed out, Illinois has amended its grievance policy to require
that prisoners name all of the people involved in the incident.217 Illinois
took this action after the Seventh Circuit rejected a nonexhaustion
defense and allowed a prisoner’s case to proceed.218 The Seventh
Circuit rejected a claim that the prisoner’s grievance was insufficiently
specific, writing that, “Illinois has not established any rule or regulation
prescribing the contents of a grievance or the necessary degree of
factual particularity.”219
The counterproductive result of such changes is that grievance
systems become more technical and complex, and thus less likely to
lead to the quick resolution of prisoners’ complaints—the ostensible
purpose of the exhaustion requirement.220 Indeed, turning grievance
procedures into a preliminary step in litigation could discourage
officials from diligently investigating and resolving complaints, for fear
of generating information that could increase their legal exposure.
Under a procedural default regime, it is much safer to dispose of
complaints with unassailable technical denials.
A procedural default rule falls more heavily on the least
sophisticated inmates—juveniles, firsttime offenders, the illiterate, the
mentally ill, and nonEnglishspeakers—than on “jailhouse lawyers.”221
Significant numbers of inmates fall into the former categories,222 and
Constitution Society), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/4587 (“Can anyone reasonably
expect a government agency to resist this kind of incentive to avoid merits consideration of
grievances?”); Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 1776 (“A rule that controls access to courts not by
examining the merits of a claim but by shutting the door on uncounseled inmates who fail to
navigate a procedural minefield is not a good one.”).
217 Brief for the A.C.L.U. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Jones v. Bock, 127 S.
Ct. 910 (2007) (Nos. 057058 & 057142), 2006 WL 2364683, at *41. Compare ILL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 20 § 504.810(b) (2005) with ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 504.810 (1998).
218 Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002).
219 Id.
220 We thank Professor Lynn Branham and John Boston for amplifying this point. See also
Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 1776.
221
Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (No. 05416),
2006 WL 304573, at *17; see also Roosevelt, supra note 13, at 1813 (“A forfeiture regime takes
an unusually vulnerable group of § 1983 plaintiffs and subjects them to an unusually heavy
regime.”).
222
See Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (No. 05416),
2006 WL 304573, at *2021 (“The National Adult Literacy Survey (NALS), conducted in 1992
by the United States Department of Education, concluded that the vast majority of inmates—
sseven out of ten—operate at the lowest two levels of literacy on a fivelevel scale. U.S. Dept. of
Education Office of Education and Research, Literacy Behind Prison Walls: Profiles of the Adult
Prison Population From the National Adult Literacy Survey xviii (1994).” In addition, “Bureau
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they may be most in need of the assistance of prison authorities or
courts.223 By increasing the incentives for technical denials, procedural
default rules reduce the likelihood that these prisoners’ claims will
come to light.
Not even the assistance of counsel can forestall procedural default
in many circumstances. Some grievance systems reject grievances that
have been prepared with the assistance of an attorney.224 And due to the
short grievance deadlines, by the time an inmate or her family finds a
lawyer willing to accept the case, the claim often will be defaulted.
Ironically, some of the most serious prison abuses—beatings and
sexual assault cases—are among the most likely to be barred, at least on
timeliness grounds, because a specific incident starts the clock running.
As Justice Stevens asked in his dissent in Woodford, referring to the
Minix case, “[d]oes a 48hour limitations period furnish a meaningful
opportunity for a prisoner to raise meritorious grievances in the context
of a juvenile who has been raped and repeatedly assaulted, with the
knowledge and assistance of guards, while in detention?”225 As we
discuss in the next section, after Woodford, this type of question will
become the focus of litigation, as prisoners and their advocates attempt
to assert inmates’ constitutional right to access to court.
IV. JURISDICTIONSTRIPPING BY CONSENT: THE EFFECTS SO FAR
The extra barriers to civil rights remedies erected by PLRA
exhaustion merit attention for several reasons. The immediate, practical
effect of the PLRA cases is to allow abuses in U.S. prisons and jails to
go unchecked. Control over prisoners’ complaints is placed in the
hands of prison officials. Not only do corrections authorities get an
opportunity to respond to the complaint before it is filed in court, but, if
an incarcerated person does not obey his jailers’ procedural rules for
making a complaint, his case may never be heard by a judge. This is
troubling not only for those who care about prisoners’ rights, but also
of Justice Statistics (BJS) surveys report that sixteen percent of state prison inmates, seven
percent of federal inmates, and sixteen percent of those in local jails ‘reported either a mental
condition or an overnight stay in a mental hospital.’ PAULA M. DITTON, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF INMATES AND
PROBATIONERS 1 (1999).”).
223 See LINDSAY M. HAYES, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON SUICIDE PREVENTION
PRACTICES WITHIN THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION (2007), available at
http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/doc/hays_ma_doc_report.pdf.
224 Brief for the A.C.L.U. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Jones v. Bock, 127 S.
Ct. 910 (2007) (Nos. 057085 and 057142), 2006 WL 2364683, at *43 (citing Memo from Legal
Claims Adjudicator for Mississippi Department of Corrections (Mar. 31, 2003)).
225 Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Minix v. Pazera, No. 1:04 CV
447 RM, 2005 WL 1799538, at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 2005)).
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for those who are concerned more generally about civil rights and
access to courts.
A particularly disturbing example of why corrections staff should
not hold the keys to the courthouse surfaced the day after Woodford was
decided. A federal prison guard in Tallahassee Florida shot and killed
an officer of the Inspector General’s office who was attempting to arrest
him for alleged participation in a sexforcontraband ring involving
numerous guards and prisoners.226 The officers involved in the abuse
reportedly had threatened prisoners to keep them quiet, monitoring their
calls and warning that they could be transferred far from their
families.227 If the officer was willing to shoot an agent of the Inspector
General’s office, what would have happened to a prisoner who
attempted to file a grievance about this abuse? At a minimum, the
Tallahassee incident illustrates the danger of shifting control over
prisoners’ court access to prison officials.
Exhaustion decisions in the lower courts in the aftermath of
Woodford provide little comfort. In a survey of reported cases citing
Woodford in the first seven months after it was decided, the majority
were dismissed entirely for failure to exhaust.228 All claims raised in
the complaint survived the exhaustion analysis in fewer than fifteen
percent of reported cases.229 And in most of those cases, the claims
survived not because the prisoner had properly exhausted, but rather
because the court found that the administrative remedy was
“unavailable.”230
226 Abby Goodnough, U.S. Agent Dies in Shootout with Prison Guard, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2006, at A1.
227 Id.
228 A Westlaw search conducted on January 26, 2007 produced a list of 405 cases citing
Woodford. After removing Supreme Court, state, and duplicate federal cases, we were left with a
sample set of 392 cases. These included decisions by appellate and district courts, and
recommendations by magistrate judges. In 76 of these cases, the exhaustion issue was not
resolved, leaving a pool of 316 cases in which the exhaustion issue was raised, briefed, and
decided by a court. In approximately 70% of those cases, or 224 cases, all claims were dismissed
for failure to exhaust. Some claims survived the exhaustion analysis in 45 cases. All claims
survived exhaustion in only 47 cases.
229 The fact that the claims survived the initial exhaustion challenge does not necessarily mean
that they are decided on the merits. Claims that survive a motion to dismiss for nonexhaustion
may still be dismissed at that stage for another reason, on summary judgment, or for some other
procedural reason before trial.
230 See, e.g., Holcomb v. Dir. of Corr., No. C0302765 RMW, 2006 WL 3302436, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 14, 2006) (holding that plaintiff’s failure to timely appeal was excused because the
delay was caused by physical injuries and other circumstances beyond his control); Cahill v.
Arpaio, No. CV 050741PHXMHM (JCG), 2006 WL 3201018, at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 2, 2006)
(holding that plaintiff’s failure to appeal was excused because the Hearing Officer informed the
plaintiff that no further appeal was necessary); Coleman v. Butler, No. 4:05cv147RH/WCS,
2006 WL 2054355, at *3 (N.D. Fla. July 20, 2006) (plaintiff’s failure to grieve was excused
because he was told by the Department of Corrections that the subject of his complaint “was
inappropriate for the grievance procedure”); Wallace v. Williams, No. CV405140, 2006 WL
3091435, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2006) (plaintiff’s failure to grieve was excused because his
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Some of the dismissed suits are serious cases, in which the
procedural rules at issue appear unreasonable. In one South Carolina
case, Benfield v. Rushton, a prisoner alleged that while in custody he
had been raped “numerous times during a fouryear period that began in
2001.”231 When he finally told a counselor about the rapes and
requested protective custody and mental health treatment, he was
transferred to another facility and placed in a “pod” with more violent
inmates, where he again was raped.232 At the time of the suit, the
prisoner claimed that he still faced death threats and refused to go to
“the yard.”233
Mr. Benfield’s case was dismissed for failure to exhaust in a timely
manner.234 He claimed that he had not filed a grievance because he was
in the hospital for a period of time following one of the rapes; because
he did not know “that he could file a grievance about the rape” by other
inmates; and because he had already written letters to the prison
officials and state classification board about his request for protective
custody.235 The court rejected all these explanations, citing Woodford
and the South Carolina grievance policy, which provides for a fifteen
day time limit for the first step,236 and a fiveday time limit for a
subsequent appeal.237 The court concluded, “it is the responsibility of
the prisoner to fully comply with the terms of the applicable policy
regarding time limits and procedural matters.”238
In another sexual assault case, this one from Michigan, Fitzpatrick
v. Williams, a prisoner alleged that officials had failed to protect him
from another prisoner who “forcibly raped him in the shower on four
occasions in August and September of 2004.”239 Mr. Fitzpatrick further
alleged corrections officials had failed to get him adequate medical
treatment in the aftermath of the rape, and had placed him in
administrative segregation when he complained about it.240 He filed
grievances regarding his Eighth Amendment claims and appealed them
through all three steps of the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) process. However, he wrote a fourth grievance about the

three requests for a grievance form were ignored).
231 Benfield v. Rushton, No. 8:062609JFABHH, 2007 WL 30287, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan 4,
2007).
232 Id.
233 Id. at *2.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 SOUTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, GA01.12 (issued 11/1/04), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/woodford.
237 Benfield, 2007 WL 30287, at *3.
238 Id. at *4.
239 Fitzpatrick v. Williams, No. 106cv499, 2006 WL 2528446, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 31,
2006).
240 Id.
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retaliation claim that was rejected by prison administrators as
untimely.241 Citing Woodford, the court dismissed Mr. Fitzpatrick’s
retaliation claim for failure to properly exhaust.242 The Michigan
grievance policy cited by the court requires an attempt at informal
resolution within two working days, and a Step I grievance within five
days of the response from informal resolution.243
The PLRA exhaustion cases illustrate jurisdictionstripping by
consent—courts tying their own hands to hear constitutional claims
through rules that are (at least arguably) extrastatutory.244 The risk of
consensual jurisdictionstripping (or “jurisdictionabdication” as our
colleague Christopher Lasch would describe it) is heightened in prisoner
cases. Courts’ impatience with pro se prisoner cases makes some
judges eager to relinquish review—so eager that they lose sight of the
need to safeguard the judiciary’s authority.245 Or courts may be ready
to cooperate with a philosophy of judicial restraint shared by the
politicians who appointed them,246 particularly when judges have been
criticized for “activism” in the prison litigation context.247
As both Woodford and the Sixth Circuit decisions in the Jones
cases demonstrate, courts may engraft onto a statute judicial glosses that
further restrict court access. Or courts may suggest that they can be
relieved of certain categories of cases if only federal rules are

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3. Other aspects of the court’s decisions in Fitzpatrick—a statement that prisoners
must “allege and show” exhaustion by attaching copies of grievances to their complaints, 2006
WL 2528446, at *2 and 2006 WL 3203899, at *1, and that inmates must name all defendants in
their initial grievances in order to sue them later, id., have been rejected by Jones. See supra
notes 12332 and accompanying text.
243 MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS POLICY DIRECTIVE NO. 03.02.130 (effective
12/19/03).
244 In 1996, soon after passage of the PLRA, Professors Tushnet and Yackle argued that it was
actually Congress that was following the courts’ lead in enacting the PLRA. They wrote that
courts already had restricted prisoners’ rights, and predicted that “courts are likely to read the
AEDPA and the PLRA to make only modest adjustments to the policies the judiciary had already
adopted.” Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 53, at 1222, 84.
245 This phenomenon is not unique to prisoner claims.
As Professor Judith Resnik has
explained, “[f]ederal judges, in their collective voice, have become advocates for less judging and
less rightsholding.” Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the
Death of Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 192 (2003). By “permit[ting] the devolution of
cases deemed to be uninteresting,” id. at 193, federal judges have helped to “develop[] a
hierarchy of adjudicators [which] relegate[s] low status litigants to low status judges.” Id. at 196.
The Woodford decision represents a significant new development in this trend, as courts delegate
and defer not to a state court or an administrative agency, but to the prison administration.
246
Professors Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson offer a theory of “partisan entrenchment”
through the judicial appointments process. They argue that, “courts tend to cooperate with and
legitimate the constitutional innovations of the political forces that entrench them . . . .” Balkin &
Levinson, supra note 8, at 53334; see also Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of
Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2315 (2006) (“[P]olitical competition in
government often tracks party lines more than branch ones.”).
247 See supra notes 53 and 64 and accompanying text.
241
242
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changed.248
It is not hard to imagine courts’ motivations for complicity in
jurisdictionstripping in the prisoners’ rights context. Because many
prisoners are pro se, their “cases [may] seem at first glance to be legally
uninteresting and unworthy of more serious consideration.”249 As
Justice Breyer explained at oral argument in Jones:
Probably the reason [the courts] do this is that there are lots and lots
of claims by prisoners in Federal courts that are hard to decipher.
[The courts] don’t know what it’s about. They don’t want to put the
[institutional] defendant to the burden of coming in [to respond to]
every single complaint when it’s quite a good probability it’s about
nothing. That’s the kind of reasoning that would lead to a rule like
this.250

The problem with the type of jurisdictionabdication that Justice
Breyer describes is that, in embracing rigid, brightline rules in order to
get rid of irritating cases, courts may find that they have tied their own
hands when they subsequently want to reassert authority. For example,
while commentators have discussed how law made in the “War on
Terror” context can affect domestic rights,251 the converse is also true.
248 See Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919 (2007) (noting that the added specificity
requirement imposed by the Sixth Circuit’s rules could be enacted by amending the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure). We thank Professor Lynn Branham for pointing out this aspect of the
opinion.
249 Jessica Feierman, “The Power of the Pen”: Jailhouse Lawyers, Literacy, and Civic
Engagement, 41 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 369, 378 (2006) (citation omitted). There is already
evidence to suggest that pro se prisoner cases “often receive inferior treatment at the appellate
level.” Id. “Pro se prisoner petitions frequently fall into the category of cases decided without
oral argument on the advice of a court staff attorney. Such cases are also less likely to be
published and available for citation than the cases of wealthier litigants with representation.” Id.
(citing Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S.
Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1506 (2004)); see also Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note
40, at 1588 (“Judges themselves occasionally confess their disinclination to give pro se pleadings
a full and fair examination.”).
250 Transcript of Oral Argument, Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007) (Nos. 057058 & 05
7142), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/057058.pdf. The
frustration that federal judges experience in dealing with prisoner cases was also reflected in
Justice Scalia’s comments during oral arguments in Winkelman v. Parma City School District, a
case in which the Court addressed whether parents of children with disabilities may represent
themselves in suits filed under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Justice Scalia
explained to the Winkelmans’ lawyer that requiring representation “protect[s] the court from
frivolous suits” and that permitting plaintiffs to proceed pro se “make[s] a lot more work for
federal district judges.” Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments on AutismCase Dispute,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, at A12. The Winkelman’s lawyer replied that “a capable district
judge” would be able to determine whether the parents’ suits were meritorious. Id. Justice
Scalia’s response was telling. “And do it right after reading pro se prisoner petitions, right?” he
asked. “You’d have a nice evening’s work.” Id.
251
See, e.g., Sean Riordan, Military Commissions in America? Domestic Liberty Implications
of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, available at http://works.bepress/com/sean_riordan/1/;
Parry, supra note 8, at 83435 (“The pressures that generate the processes associated with the war
on terror apply more broadly, so that we are experiencing general modification of the way in
which our government investigates and imposes punishment on people.”).
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The case of Rumsfeld v. Padilla provides a cautionary tale about
the farreaching effects of procedural rules announced in pedestrian
prisoner cases. In 2004, the Supreme Court declined to reach the merits
of alleged alQaeda operative Jose Padilla’s case on jurisdictional
grounds.252 The government’s jurisdictional argument—that a prisoner
may name as a habeas respondent only his immediate physical
custodian and may file a habeas petition only in the district where he is
confined—was all too familiar to advocates who represent prisoners in
gardenvariety habeas actions.253
Unfortunately, the government had developed a habeas jurisdiction
doctrine in a line of mundane parole and prison cases.254 Based on the
weight of this precedent, the government carried the day. The courts
dismissed Mr. Padilla’s habeas action, which his lawyer had filed in
New York two days after the government whisked him to a military brig
in South Carolina; he had to refile in the Fourth Circuit.255
The territorial restriction on habeas jurisdiction that scuttled the
Padilla case gained widespread currency after it was endorsed by the
D.C. Circuit in a series of routine prisoner cases.256 The D.C. Circuit
has made clear that it adopted a territorial jurisdiction rule to avoid an
onslaught of petitions and suits by federal prisoners who lacked any
connection to the District of Columbia, and who were seeking to forum
shop.257 However, the rule that Circuit adopted was later applied in
Padilla to deprive a federal court of the ability to inquire into the
legality of the detention of a 9/11 prisoner arrested on a material witness
warrant that it had issued.258
The Woodford Court’s procedural default gloss on PLRA
exhaustion could produce similarly farreaching consequences that tie
federal courts’ hands even when they are faced with a live controversy
in which ongoing violations of federal constitutional rights are
occurring—or even, as in Padilla, when their own orders are at stake. If
a prisoner misses a deadline in a grievance procedure, a federal court
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 44247 (2004).
Id. at 43447.
254 Id. at 435, 445 (citing Blango v. Thornburgh, 942 F.2d 1487, 149192 (10th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam); Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Billiteri v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 541
F.2d 938, 948 (2d Cir. 1976)); see also Shay & O’Toole, supra note 183.
255 Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 431. The following year, even the Fourth Circuit tired of the
government’s forumshopping, and rebuked the government when it sought to transfer Mr.
Padilla from military to civilian custody, a move which would have forestalled further review by
the Supreme Court. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2005).
256 Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1986); ChatmanBey v. Thornburgh, 864
F.2d 804, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Shay & O’Toole, supra note 183.
257 Razzoli v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 230 F.3d 371, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“ChatmanBey
made clear that a major implication of habeas exclusivity in cases involving federal prisoners was
its impact on venue.”).
258 542 U.S. at 44247; see Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that
district court had issued material witness warrant).
252
253
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may not be able to inquire into the claim. Similarly, after Jones, if a
prisoner names the wrong defendant in a system in which grievance
rules require that all defendants be identified, courts may not be able to
consider a claim against the proper defendant after the deadline for
filing a grievance has passed.
Jones reins in courts from creating hypertechnical rules to bar
prisoners’ suits, but it also appears to hand prison officials carte
blanche to design complicated procedural barriers to prisoners’ court
access. To be sure, the Jones Court warned lower federal courts that
they could not go too far in creating jurisdictionabdication rules.259
Jones makes clear that courts cannot create out of whole cloth
procedural requirements with no basis in the statute or generally
applicable rules.260 Nonetheless, Jones dramatizes the damage that the
Court’s decision in Woodford already has done to the availability of
relief in § 1983. As the Jones namethedefendant discussion
demonstrates,261 exhaustion analysis is now focused on the meaning of
prison grievance procedures.262
The question going forward is whether there is any limit to courts’
total deference to prison grievance policies. At some point, will courts
determine that short deadlines or detailed requirements are so stringent
that they deny prisoners a “meaningful opportunity” to seek relief?263
Will courts decide that hypertechnical requirements render grievance
systems “unavailable” within the meaning of the PLRA,264 or violate the
constitutional mandate of court access?265
Civil rights advocates hope that rules that unreasonably block
meritorious constitutional claims may be subject to constitutional
challenge, or to exceptions. The Woodford majority recognized that
“procedural requirements [adopted] for the purpose of tripping up all
but the most skillful prisoners,”266 might be questioned, presumably
under a theory that prisoners possess a right of access to courts.267
Justice Breyer’s concurrence indicates that standard administrative law
and habeas exceptions to procedural default may apply in some
circumstances.268 For example, in the habeas corpus context, a
Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 926 (2007).
Id. This message was reiterated later this term in Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197. See
supra note 21.
261 Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 92223.
262 In fact, the result in Jones could have been different had the Sixth Circuit found procedural
default based on noncompliance with a grievance policy that—like the 11 policies identified by
the LSO clinic survey—requires inmates to name the defendants.
263 Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 239293 (2006).
264 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
265 Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 240304 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
266 Id. at 2392.
267 Id. at 2404 (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996)).
268 Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2393 (Breyer, J., concurring).
259
260
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procedural default may be excused if the state procedural rule is not
“firmly established and regularly followed.”269 In preWoodford
decisions, the Second Circuit identified some circumstances in which a
prisoner’s failure to exhaust may be excused,270 and recognized that
threats or retaliation by the defendants may estop them from raising
exhaustion as a defense.271 It remains to be seen how the lower courts
will treat such exceptions after Woodford,272 let alone how this area of
doctrine will fare on a return trip to the High Court.
It is possible that PLRA exhaustion doctrine will collapse under its
own weight. Under the analysis adopted in Woodford, lower courts are
required to pore over prison and jail regulations to determine if a
prisoner has properly exhausted.273 Some courts are concluding that
these questions require evidentiary hearings.274 The Seventh Circuit
recently remanded a case for further factfinding to answer numerous
questions created by the conflicting evidence as to exhaustion including:
Could [the prisoner] have obtained the necessary forms to file a
grievance against these named prison officials? Could he have
appealed to the Bureau of Prisons’ Regional Director without the
appropriate form? See 28 C.F.R. § 524.14(a), (d)(1). Would the
Bureau of Prisons have permitted a tardy grievance after [the
prisoner’s] transfer and is there any way that a prison would know
whether the prison system considers such a situation ‘a valid reason
for delay’? See 28 C.F.R. § 524.14(b). At what point did the prison
officials’ misconduct, if there was any, rise to the level so as to
prevent a grievance from being filed? 275

Perhaps courts will tire of this exercise, and increasingly decide
that grievance policies are not “available” or do not provide a
“meaningful opportunity” for a prisoner to seek relief.276 Such rulings
Id.; see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 62, § 26.2d, at 1293.
See, e.g., Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 2004); Hemphill v. New York, 380
F.3d 680, 68990 (2d Cir. 2004).
271 Ziemba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 2004).
272 Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We need not determine
what effect Woodford has on our case law in this area, however, because Ruggiero could not have
prevailed even under our preWoodford case law.”).
273 See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 233 (3d Cir. 2004) (detailed discussion of the
requirements of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections grievance system).
274 See, e.g., Maraglia v. Maloney, No. 200112144RBC, 2006 WL 3741927 (D. Mass Dec.
18, 2006); Parker v Robinson, No. 04214BW, 2006 WL 2904780 (D. Me. Oct. 10, 2006);
Blount v. Boyd, No. 7:05cv00643, 2006 WL 2381968 (W.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2006). But see
Williams v. Rich, No. CV 606003, 2006 WL 2534417, at *45 & *5 n.5 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 30,
2006) (noting that “factual determinations regarding exhaustion (or lack thereof) under §
1997e(a) often pose problems for the district courts,” but electing to resolve the factual dispute
without an evidentiary hearing “[because] affording prisoners evidentiary hearings on exhaustion
related issues would frustrate the PLRA’s purpose of curtailing inmate litigation.”).
275 Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 686 (7th Cir. 2006).
276 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000); Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 239293 (2006). In fact,
some courts have already determined in individual cases that deciding the exhaustion question is
269
270
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could pressure corrections officials to implement meaningful grievance
systems, which solve problems and provide relief to prisoners.277 Or
perhaps more judges will become disillusioned by their inability to
grant relief in serious cases and begin criticizing the PLRA exhaustion
requirement as some have criticized mandatory minimums in sentencing
law.278 After all, addressing constitutional issues on the merits has the
added benefit of correcting abuses and clarifying prison officials’ legal
duties.
Woodford caused barely a ripple when it was decided. However,
PLRA exhaustion is slowly gaining attention as a civil rights issue
outside of the usual prisoners’ rights circles. In 2006, the Commission
more timeconsuming than simply proceeding to dismiss the case on the merits. See, e.g., Fisher
v. Mullin, No. 067061, 2007 WL 127655, at *1 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (proceeding directly to the
merits rather than addressing exhaustion dispute); see also Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2392 (“[The
district court may] dismiss plainly meritless claims without first addressing what may be a much
more complex question, namely, whether the prisoner did in fact properly exhaust available
administrative remedies.”).
An alternative, and alarming, possibility is that courts will simply defer to prison officials’
determination as to whether administrative remedies are “available.” In Latham v Pate, a
prisoner filed suit alleging that he had suffered serious injuries after being assaulted by a group of
correctional officers. No. 1:06CV150, 2007 WL 171792 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2007). The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Latham had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. Latham’s initial grievance was rejected as untimely because it was filed one and a half
years late. In his Step II appeal, Latham claimed that he had been in segregation and
administration segregation since the incident and was not provided with grievance forms. The
magistrate judge considering Latham’s case noted that “MDOC officials investigated the matter
and denied the grievance as untimely at both Steps II and III, concluding that the grievance was
untimely ‘without reasonable explanation [by the inmate].’” Id. at *2. The magistrate judge
concluded that plaintiff’s claims should therefore be dismissed.
In Garcia v. Glover, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the lower court’s dismissal for failure to
exhaust. 197 Fed. Appx. 866 (11th Cir. 2006). Garcia, a federal prisoner, alleged that he had
been physically and verbally abused by five unnamed prison officials in the county jail in which
he was detained. While admitting that he had failed to file a grievance, Garcia contended that his
failure to exhaust should be excused because he feared retaliation. Id. at 867. He claimed that
when the officers took him to the hospital after the attack, they threatened to beat him again if he
reported the incident. Id. at 86768. Without considering whether the jail’s administrative
remedies were rendered “unavailable,” the court concluded that “[b]ecause exhaustion was a
precondition to filing this lawsuit, and Garcia admittedly did not exhaust his administrative
remedies, his amended complaint properly was dismissed” Id. at 868.
277 See LYNN S. BRANHAM, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL: LIMITING THE BURDENS OF
PRO SE INMATE LITIGATION (1997).
278 Lynette Clemetson, Judges Look to New Congress for Changes in Mandatory Sentencing
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at A12. At least one judge has already expressed concern about
the incentives Ngo creates. See Parker v. Robinson, No. 04214BW, 2006 WL 2904780, at *12
(D. Me. 2006) (“I must say that in my view this case illustrates that the Ngo majority does seem
overly optimistic about the hope of a constructive resolution of the prisoner’s complaint at the
prelitigation grievance stage . . . . In Parker’s case the Commissioner was given a timely,
although procedurally flawed, opportunity to review his grievance concerning his cell extraction
and the Commissioner, after reviewing the legible, articulate, and earnest grievance, elected to
rebuff it on procedural grounds rather than deny it on its merits. In my opinion this is a case that
the State’s attorney might have elected to waive her § 1997e(a) argument. However, the
defendants have chosen to ardently press this issue wielding § 1997e(a) as a sword rather than a
shield.”).
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on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons—a private blue ribbon
panel—issued a report recommending amendments to the statute.279 In
February 2007, the American Bar Association (ABA) issued a
resolution calling for reform of the PLRA, including the exhaustion
requirement.280 Human Rights Watch is also monitoring PLRA
exhaustion issues,281 and has previously issued a report on inmateon
inmate rape in U.S. prisons, urging Congress to amend the PLRA to
require states to certify that their grievance procedures comply with
standards set out in CRIPA.282
At the time this article went to press, a coalition of advocates and
scholars had formed to seek revision of the PLRA.283 It remains to be
seen whether Congress will respond to these calls. In the meantime,
civil rights advocates can litigate possible exceptions to the Woodford
doctrine, challenge unreasonable grievance procedures that infringe on
access to courts, and collect examples of egregious cases in which
meritorious claims were dismissed for nonexhaustion.
CONCLUSION
Although we recognize that creative strategies are needed to
improve the quality of prisoner lawsuits filed in federal courts, the
Woodford procedural default rule is too blunt an instrument for the job,
throwing out meritorious as well as frivolous claims, and restricting
courts’ ability to address even the most serious abuses. It is possible
that a meaningful reduction in prisoner litigation can only be
accomplished by stemming the tide upstream—by designing grievance
systems that meaningfully address complaints,284 or by appointing
inspectors general for “independent oversight.”285 More fundamentally,
and somewhat obviously, the amount of prisoner litigation could be
reduced by improving conditions and incarcerating fewer people. In the
shortterm, however, court intervention remains an important counter
majoritarian check on the abuse of prisoners.286 The PLRA—and the
279 CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT 8487 (John J. Gibbons & Nicholas De B. Katzenbach eds.,
2006).
280 See
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2007/midyear/docs/SUMMARYOFRECOMMENDATIONS/h
undredtwob.doc.
281 Telephone conversation with Sarah Tofte, Human Rights Watch (February 7, 2007).
282 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS (April 1, 2001),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report.html.
283
See web site of the SAVE coalition, http://www.savecoalition.org, of which author
Giovanna Shay is a member. See also Schlanger and Shay, supra note 216.
284 Branham, supra note 79, at 48388.
285 CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT, supra note 279, at 16, 7981.
286 See James D. Maynard, One Case for an Independent Federal Judiciary: Prison Reform
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judicial gloss on it approved by Woodford—have disabled this
mechanism.
Woodford and Jones mark an important shift in the balance of
power between jailers and courts. The PLRA exhaustion cases occur at
a time in which we see a concentration of executive power on many
fronts—the “War on Terror” being the most visible example.287 In
contrast to the “War on Terror” cases, in which the Court has in many
instances reserved its authority to examine and to limit expanded claims
of executive authority,288 in the PLRA cases, courts at all levels have
been far more willing collaborators in relinquishing their own oversight
authority. In large part, the judiciary’s engagement with the “War on
Terror” cases may be inspired by the context in which they have been
presented—highprofile, welllitigated cases involving timely issues of
acknowledged national importance. In a time of perceived national
security and civil liberties emergency, courts may view themselves as
guardians of fundamental liberties.289 By contrast, America’s historic
incarceration rate,290 and the potential for abuse that accompanies it, is
not yet perceived by the judiciary as an emergency—at least not one
critical enough to overcome its distaste for pro se prisoner lawsuits.

Litigation Spurs Structural Change in California, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 419, 423, 447 (2006).
287 See supra note 41.
288 See supra notes 35 and accompanying text.
289 We thank Professor Dan Kahan for this insight. But see Parry, supra note 8, at 766, 782
(arguing that a “perception of emergency” has permitted development of a “new criminal
process,” and that courts, while checking the “most farreaching executive power claims,” have
not prevented “a net increase in executive power”).
290 THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES: THIRTYTHREE
CONSECUTIVE
YEARS
OF
GROWTH,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/
Admin/Documents/publications/inc_newfigures.pdf (reporting that the Bureau of Justice
Statistics 2005 incarceration figures “represent a record 33year continuous rise in the number of
inmates in the U.S.,” producing the highest incarceration rate in the world).

